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Abstract:
Globalisation and security vie individually for the status of the most important, yet least
well conceptualised, of issues for academics and policy-makers. Moreover, despite the growing
sense of its significance, the interconnection of globalisation and security, or globalisation-
security nexus, is also understudied and poorly conceptualised. Finally, the differential impact of
the globalisation-security nexus upon the various regions of the world is also understudied. This
working paper is an initial attempt to fill these gaps in our knowledge by investigating the
globalisation-security nexus in both generic conceptual terms and in relation to the specific
impact of globalisation in the Asia-Pacific region. Th  first part of the paper demonstrates how
globalisation as a qualitatively new phenomenon is capable of transcending territorial and
sovereign space, exploits potential divisibility between the security interests of sovereign states
and their citizens, and has thus challenged us to extend our conceptions of security and to
interlink domestic and international security issues. The second section of the paper then argues
that globalisation requires a vertical extension of security in terms of the looking below the level
of the state and at alternative security actors, including societal groups, individuals and TNCs,
which are also capable of consuming, denying and supplying security to others. The horizontal
expansion of security is needed in terms of broadening the security agenda away from the
traditional military dimension and towards economic, environmental and societal security is ues
which have come to the fore under conditions of globalisation. The third section of the paper
then moves on to demonstrate how globalisation has had a differential impact across regions in
accordance with the ability of sovereign states, the existing unit for ordering social space, to
resist the impact of trans-sovereign problems. In th  case of the Asia-Pacific, this paper argues
that the twin processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation have placed relative limits upon this
ability for states, left them systemically vulnerable to globalisation as a process which
emphasises the divisibility of state and societal security interests, and hence enabled
globalisation to exacerbate existing military, economic and environmental security problems in
the region.
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2Introduction: interconnection of globalisation and security
*
Globalisation and security vie individually for the status of the least well-conceptualised, but
yet most controversial, of academic and policy-making issues. Security has been described as
an underdeveloped concept (Buzan 1991: 3), and globalisation, for a variety of reasons and as
briefly described below, has been subject to any number of definitions. That both issues are
so often poorly conceptualised, therefore, only gives further grounds for concern when
attempting to examine the two in conjunction. For if academics and policy-makers alike can
agree that globalisation and security are the two most pressing of contemporary international
issues, but still experience difficulty even in analysing them in separation, then the prospects
for understanding their intersection and the globalisation-security nexus appear to be poor. In
these uncertain circumstances, we all should fear for our security.
There is thus an urgent need to define and interconnect the twin issues of globalisation and
security--the first of the reasons why this CSCAP working group is so important and timely.
Indeed, it could be argued that a number of pioneering attempts have already been made to
investigate the relationship between globalisation and security (Cha 2000: 392), in terms of
its creation of new security actors, problems and responses. However, although very valuable
in providing a starting point and emergent framework for consideration of the globalisation-
security nexus, these attempts have tended to lack a strong empirical basis and geographical
focus. Such a focus is important because globalisation is likely to differ in its security impact
between regional contexts--the second of the reasons why this working group and its
investigation of the globalisation and security relationship specific to the Asia-Pacific is so
significant.
                                  
*
 A draft version of this working paper was first delivered at the 8th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on
Comprehensive and Cooperative Security, 19-21 October 000, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
3All of this argues that there is a need to combine the study of globalisation and security, but
that this also should be carried out through the balanced application of analytical frameworks
to particular regional cases. The consequent objective of this short paper is to seek to make a
initial contribution to the working group's examination of globalisation and security by
following this very approach. Hence, the paper attempts, in a number of stages, to both build
upon the existing globalisation-security nexus literature and to extend it to the case of the
Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War (or post-globalisation) period. The first of these
stages is to define more fully the essence of the term globalisation, and the inherent problems
that it presents more generically for the poses for the existing international order. The second
stage is then to examine the general impact of globalisation upon security, in regard to its
generation of new and re-emergent security actors, threats, and policy responses. The third
stage is then to apply this model to the Asia-Pacific in order to assist our understanding of the
differential impact of globalisation in the region, and the particular problems it poses for
states and their citizens.
Conceptions of globalisation
Definitions
As noted above, globalisation is a notoriously slippery concept and has produced a
bewildering number of definitions (Scholte 2000: 44-6). Globalisation has been defined
variously as universalisation (the expansion of cultures across the globe); internationalisation
(increased interaction and interdependence between people in different states);
Westernisation or Americanisation (the homogenisation of the world along Western or US
standards); and liberalisation (the spread of deregulated forces of technology, production,
trade, and finance across borders). Many of these definitions are indeed facets of
4globalisation--both in terms of its causation and eventual outcomes (Clark 1998: 484). But
these definitions still fail to capture the qualitatively different nature of globalisation from
other processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of social forces on a global
scale. Globalisation represents a qualitatively different process due to its essential de-
territorialisation, or put conversely, supra-territorialisation of social interaction (Scholte
1997: 431). That is to say, globalisation is a process which increasingly reconfigures social
space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory, and ranscendsexisting physical
and human borders imposed upon social interaction. For instance, global financial
transactions, facilitated by information technology, can now often operate without reference
to physical territorial distance or human-imposed territorial barriers. It is important to avoid
the type of 'hyper-globalisation' thesis which views the world as moving towards a condition
of being totally 'borderless'. For it is apparent that there is considerable territorial 'drag' upon
the free-flow of globalisation forces, wide disparities in the degree of globalisation across
different regions of the world, and both resistance to and reversibility in the process itself.
Nevertheless, globalisation as a process of supra-territorialisation is increasingly affecting
large sections of the world, and must be acknowledged as a markedly different (although
certainly not unrelated) process to those other definitions of social interaction noted above.
Hence, even though universalism, internationalisaion, westernisation and liberalisation may
eventually result in globalisation, the fact that they may not necessarily be entirely detached
from territorialisation means that they remain on a qualitatively different level to the
inherently supra-territorial phenonmena of globalisation. After all, if we could equate exactly
globalisation with any of these other phenomena, then there would be little need to consider it
is as anything new or to search for new vocabulary to describe it, and policy prescriptions
would already be in our hands.
5Globalisation and challenges to the state
The phenomena of globalisation as supra-territorialisation and the reconfiguration of social
space carries significant implications for existing forms of social organisation, and, most
importantly in the case of security issues, the dominant position of the nation state (or far
more accurately for many states, sovereign state) within the existing globality. Needless to
say, the state with its monopoly of exclusive jurisdiction--or in other words sovereignty--over
a particular social and territorial space, delineated by a combination of physical geography
and most especially human construction, has been the basic unit for the division of global
space in the modern era. States in the past have attempted in theory and practice to exercise
sovereign control over all forms of social interaction in the political, economic, and security
dimensions, both within and between their territorial borders. Quite clearly, and as elucidated
below with reference to the Asia-Pacific region, not all states throughout history have been
able to exercise the same degree of sovereign control over all forms of social interaction. But
nevertheless, sovereign states rooted in territorial notions of social space have been the prime
unit for facilitating, impeding and mediating interaction between the social groups,
organisations, and citizens and other categories of collective and individual social units
contained within their borders. Hence, to date, global social space has been primarily
international, or inter-sovereign state, social space.
However, the inherent nature of globalisation as a process which transcends and overrides
territoriality as the dominant principle for the organisation of social space now poses a
fundamental challenge to the sovereign state as the basic social unit which exemplifies and
undergirds this very territorial principle. Sovereign states must now contend with the freer
flow of social forces on a global scale which move with declining reference to the previous
limitations and channels imposed by state borders. This inc easing porosity or irrelevance of
6state borders, relative decline in the de facto sovereign authority of states over forms of social
interaction, and corresponding increased exposure of 'internal' social groupings to 'external
forces' (or even indeed the removal of the traditional domestic-international divide to create
an intermestic arena for social interchange) has a number of outcomes for security which will
be discussed below. For if global social space has been primarily international or inter-
sovereign state space for much of the modern era, then the security order as one aspect of
social interaction has been primarily built around the inter-state order. But it is clear that the
security order is now pitted against the phenomenon of globalisation which generates security
issues diametrically opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign state authority.
Globalisation: causation and policy response
Before moving on, though, to examine the general consequences of globalisation for security
and then seeking to apply these conceptions to the context of the Asia-Pacific, it is first
necessary to take note briefly of the causes that lie behind the phenomena. This is because,
only if we are equipped with a clearer understanding of the causes of globalisation and its
relation to insecurity, can we then also attempt to tackle conceptually the possibilities of
framing an effective security policy response.
This need to consider the causes of globalisation is made all the more important by the fact
that all too often it is viewed in a deterministic fashion--especially in neo-liberal economics
analysis--as a phenomena which somehow occurs naturally through spontaneous and
unconscious social interaction amongst rational economic actors, and which is largely
inevitable and irreversible in its trajectory. To be sure, and as will be argued below in the
case of the Asia-Pacific, globalisation is caused to a large degree by the release of liberal
economic forces (hence the point that globalisation may bring about but is not necessarily
7coeval with liberalisation), is in part the outcome of unconnected actors seeking to exploit
economic complementarities that subvert the economic spaces centred on sovereign states,
and is on powerful forward trajectory in its diffusion across the core economic regions of the
globe. Nonetheless, at the same time, it is important to understand that the role of liberal
economic forces in propelling globalisation forward is in turn the outcome of conscious
decisions (or more usually non-decisions, and the acquiescence in policies of inaction so as to
avoid perceived costly policy choices) on the part of political actors. Hence, whether these
actors are states, social groups, individuals, or organisations such as transnational
corporations (TNC), they have to be seen as the prime movers in constructing the
sociopolitical structures which underpin the dominance of liberal economics, and the
consequent spread of globalisation (Higgott 1999: 27). If we then view globalisation as a
process which is driven by human choice and the deliberate pursuit of liberal economic gains,
rather than as some form of leviathan which is no longer subjugated to the dictate of humans
but has acquired a life of its own, then it is possible to understand the causation and the
reversibility, or at least manageability, of the process. Based on this understanding, the fate of
security still lies in human hands, and it should also be possible to conceptualise policy
responses to the security impact of globalisation.
Globalisation's impact on security: levels, dimensions, responses
If we are to view globalisation as a process which is driven forward by political choice in
favour of liberal economics, and results in forms of social interaction which transcend
territorial borders and state sovereignty, then it is possible to conceive of its impact on
security in a number of areas. These involve both the vertical extension of security in terms
of levels of actors, and the horizontal extension in terms of dimensions of security issues.
81. Levels of actors
The first of these areas concerns the identification and expanding number of security actors
under conditions of globalisation. Arguably, three broad categorisations of security actors can
be identified: those actors subject to security threats (often termed the referent object of
security); those actors which impose security threats upon others; and those which supply
security to others. Clearly none of these identities is mutually exclusive, and a certain actor
may assume different identities according to the context and perception of onlookers (ie. the
rather tired adage that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter). Indeed, the
appeal for public legitimacy of certain states and groups as victims rather than imposers of
insecurity, and consequent blurring of security actor identities is one byproduct of the
diffusion of the mass media and globalisation. Moreover, security actors themselves can
move between and assume different identities, as in the case of narcotics cartels, which,
although often categorised as forms of social organisations, can also virtually usurp the
functions and identities of states. But just significant as the ability of the globalisation process
to obscure the identities of security actors has been its ability to expand the range and level of
actors which can assume the three identities.
One noticeable impact of globalisation has been to accentuate the concept, which has
preexisted in certain contexts, that the state's position as the prime referent object of security
is now rivalled by other social groupings. The study of security has traditionally rested upon
the assumption that the security of the institution of the sovereign state can be necessarily
conflated with the security of the 'nation' or general population and citizenry contained within
that state's borders. Hence, in the past and still in the contemporary period, the tendency of
security studies has been to argue that the survival of states, as institutions which are created
as the embodiment of collective national will, and which serve as the point of interface or
9'gatekeeper' to shield their citizenry and populations from external threats, is indivisible from
the survival of peoples and nations. The result has been to produce a view of security which
concentrates not just upon states as the key referent objects of security (Waever 1995:49), but
also mainly upon the external aspects of state security. For the traditional paradigm, then,
security is concerned with external threats to states, and especially those threats imposed
upon states by inter-sovereign state conflict--the natural outcome of friction in an
international system dominated by states as the major actors all seeking to ensure the security
of their own populations from external challenges.
The identity and role of sovereign states as the referent object of security, undoubtedly
remains central to our understanding of security in the contemporary era, and this may be
especially so for those states which can assert with conviction the character of being nation
states, marked by a cohesive association between the security interests of state as an
institution and its 'national' population as a whole. In ot er instances, though, the assumption
that the security of states as referent objects approximates with that of the population or
nation at large, and consequently that all states focus upon external threat perceptions, is
inaccurate. The tendency of the traditional security paradigm to 'black box' internal state
dynamics means that inevitably it neglects also those internal threats which arise from a
fundamental divergence between the perceived security interests of states themselves and
segments of their population. Newly established and late-starter sovereign states with borders
cutting across and encompassing a variety of national and ethnic groups are particularly
sensitive to internal security threats. It is often the case that such states face small or large
numbers of ethnic groups which reject the definition of nation and state emanating from the
government and view themselves as subject to oppression. As a result, these groups seek
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instead to secure autonomy or to secede, and may often launch insurgency movements, so
challenging the integrity and internal stability of the state.
Another internal security problem, often independent of, but also at times inter-linked with
and capable of reinforcing ethnic separatism, is that of a crisis of the state's political
legitimacy and leadership amongst the general population. In certain states, the majority of
the population may support the cause of national and state integrity, but come to reject the
political legitimacy of the government system or governing regime and elite. The antagonism
of the general population towards the political regime may be aroused by a variety of factors
centring on perceptions of misgovernment, including the management of the economy, issues
of crime and corruption, and the commitment to stable or democratic government. The
outcome can be political turmoil, violent demonstrations, revolt, and even revolution. If
prolonged, political unrest can bring the prospect of factionalism and civil war. Most
explosive of all is a combination of political crisis and ethnic separatism which can threaten
the internal disintegration of a state. As will be mentioned below, many states in the Asia-
Pacific, as developing sovereign states, but often only partially 'nation' s ates, are subject to
these twin problems of ethnic separatism and political legitimacy. Hence, these states have
focussed much of their security policy-making energy on dealing with internal rather than
external security threats.
Therefore, the argument that the state cannot be considered as the exclusive, or even main,
referent object of security, and that there is a need to give our attention to problems of the
internal security of social groupings contained within the state's sovereign territory, is not
new. Globalisation's impact, though, has been to heighten this consciousness of the potential
divisibility of the security of the sovereign state from that of its internal social elements. A
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explained above, globalisation as a process which transcends territorial and sovereign
boundaries, and thus which penetrates with relative ease the internal social space of the state,
inevitably also brings with it security effects that diminish the role of the state as the barrier
to external threats and that impact directly and differentially upon internal social groups. For
instance, globalisation has such an impact in the dimension of economic security, whereby
the free flow of market forces across borders, and the accompanying wealth creation but also
economic dislocation that it engenders, undercuts the ability of the sovereign state to act as
the principal arbiter of the economic welfare of its internal society. The result, as is w ll-
known from the East Asian financial crisis, is that social groups (ethnic and economic) and
individual citizens may endure economic costs which the state is unable to mitigate and
redistribute. In these circumstances, even though the apparatus of the state may remain intact,
social groups and individual citizens may view the state as a redundant framework for the
preservation of their economic security interests and can detach themselves from it--resulting
in the type of crisis of political legitimacy for the state described above. Globalisation's
capacity to strip the protection of the state away from social groups and citizens then helps to
explain why there has been a significant shift in security perspectives away from those
fixated on the state, and towards the irreducible, yet ultimate, level of individual and 'human
security' (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 81-2; Tow, Thakur, Hyun 2000).
Likewise, if the state's position as the principal referent object of security is challenged by
globalisation, so also must we begin to review its position as always the principal actor
responsible for the imposition and defence of threats. States clearly continue to dispose of the
greatest economic and military power capabilities, and to deny or provide internal and
external security to others on the largest scale. However, again whilst it is not an entirely new
trend, globalisation has accentuated the perception that other social actors are capable of not
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just consuming security, but also denying and supplying security to others. For example,
ethnic and minority groups can infringe the security of states and other sets of groups and
individuals if they are perceived to threaten stability by embarking on a political or military
struggle--especially if they become involved in criminal or terrorist activities. But the
opposite is also true, that these groups can be regarded as freedom fighters and the providers
of security to minorities subject to repression by states. Moreover, in much the same way as
individuals can be regarded as the irreducible referent object of security, so they must also be
regarded as the irreducible deniers and providers of security functions. Individuals even
within the legal framework of a state do still retain the capacity to inflict violence and
damage upon each other and other security actors. Acts of individual murder and assault
remain commonplace, and individuals can even pose threats to a society as a whole if they
adopt terrorist techniques and gain access to the means of violence--as shown by the
emergence of one-man bombing campaigns in the US (Unibomber) and UK (racist
bombings) in the 1990s. Individuals in many societies may also feel the responsibility to
provide for their own security, especially where the internal policing functions of the state
have broken down (for example, certain states in Africa) or where they are perceived to be
too severe (US militias suspicious of government attempts to limit the right to possess
firearms).
Furthermore, TNCs now have to be considered within the scope of deniers and providers of
economic, environmental, and even military security. Corporations clearly impose conditions
of economic insecurity on states, societal groups and individuals, through their business
activities and competition which can lead to differential patterns of poor working conditions,
unemployment and underemployment, poverty, and general economic dislocation. The
activities of corporations also lead to environmental degradation, and can have detrimental
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effects on military security, not only by the creation of a prosperous or poor economic
climate which can be conducive to increased tensions amongst security actors and the build-
up or reduction of military capacities, but also in terms of the business of the global arms
trade which facilitates these processes. Nevertheless, TNCs and private business corporations
can also be a source of security. TNCs can foster ties of interd pendence which may promote
external security amongst states or alternatively provide the economic strength to promote
independent security. They can also provide wealth and employment to segments of a state's
population which delivers general stability and internal security. In addition, TNCs and
private firms can provide an income and various welfare benefits and thus economic security
to individual workers and their families. TNCs can also provide 'privatised' military security
in a direct fashion through the employment of private armies and mercenaries to protect their
business interests and even assist the stabilisation of sovereign states (Shearer 1998).
Finally, globalisation and the trans-sovereign problems that it creates have thrust to the fore
another potential category of societal organisation which can provide security--non-
governmental organisations (NGO). The legitimacy of NGO's as security actors in some case
can certainly be questioned on grounds of accountability. Nevertheless, the ability of NGOs
to exploit open economies and new developments in technology in order to organise across
borders means that they can contribute both directly (aid activities; anti-land mine movement)
and indirectly (campaigns for debt relief; environmental protection) to the military, economic
and environmental security of individuals.
The argument of this paper is certainly not that globalisation has directly created these groups
anew as security actors. As will be noted below with reference to the Asia-Pacific, the
problems that motivate these actors originate in the constituent nature of states and the
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process of state-building. Nonetheless, globalisation has impacted in such as way as to sap
the economic and military ability of states to threaten or provide for the security of others,
and thereby create greater freedom for these alternative level security actors to operate. If
states are viewed as incapable of providing security due to their own military or economic
weakness, often generated by the destabilising effects of globalisation, then other actors have
to step into the breach.
2. Dimensions of threat: economic, environmental, societal, military
The second impact of globalisation on security has not necessarily been to create new
dimensions of threats, but to revive and exacerbate both latent and existing security
problems--so leading to the horizontal extension of security concepts mentioned above.
Globalisation's most obvious impact has been its integrative and disintegrative economic
characteristics, and the consequent knock-on effects upon the economic and then military
security of states and their social constituents. The spread of liberal market forces is capable
of bringing economic inclusion and interdependence, which may contribute to social stability
and peaceful relations internally and externally (a form of 'democratic peace' argument).
Nevertheless, the disintegrative effects of globalisation can simultaneously contribute to
insecurity in a number of ways:
a. Economic exclusion.
Globalisation can produce economic exclusion for states and individuals marked by
disparities of welfare which may feed through into military tension amongst states in an
attempt to wrest economic benefits from others, or result in internal unrest within states.
15
b. Economic disparity.
Globalisation is capable of re-mapping economic and social space, with the frequent result
that economic interdependency can pull actors and regions away from the defined territorial
space of the sovereign state and towards regions incorporated within other states. In these
instances, the rise of regionalisation can lead to the disintergration of state structures, with
unforseen consequences for internal and external security.
c. Economic competition.
Globalisation can generate economic competition amongst states, TNCs, social organisations
and individuals for scare natural resources; again often threatening to spill over into military
conflict. Moreover, the wealth it produces can fuel arms races.
d. Economic dislocation.
As already mentioned, globalisation often leads to economic poverty, crises, and insecurity
for states, social groups and individuals, all leading to social instability within and amongst
state and possible armed conflict.
Moreover, sitting in between these integrative and disintegrative economic effects of
globalisation are those security problems connected with transnational or trans-sovereign
crime. Globalisation promotes trans-sovereign crime because economic integration and
disintegration in tandem create both supply and demand, or push and pull factors, for those
actors engaged in criminal activities. By this it is meant that economic dislocation and
disparities within a certain state or social grouping creates incentives to engage in wealth-
generating activities by engaging in the supply of illicit products such as narcotics or arms. In
turn, globalisation's creation of economic wealth in certain areas of the world creates a
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market and demand for the supply of these economic commodities. Crime as an economic
activity and the trade in 'illicit' commodities is clearly not a new phenomena. Indeed, in the
past the chief suppliers of narcotics have been sovereign states themselves, the opium trade
being one notable example. But economic globalisation, facilitated by transport and
telecommunications technology, has enabled crime organisations to mimic the behaviour of
TNCs (Flynn 2000: 52), to move with still greater ease across deregulated economic space,
and thus to impinge even more directly upon the welfare of other social groups and
individuals.
The other most notable security effects of economic globalisation are environmental.
Although in the past socialist systems have been responsible for some of the worst examples
of environment degradation, the spread of liberal economic globalisation has arguably taken
these problems to new heights. Liberal capitalism's vast and largely unimpeded appetite for
natural resources, and the pollution that usually results, not only threatens directly the health
of groups of individuals in various regions (water and river pollution in Europe; air pollution
and forest fires in Southeast Asia; nuclear accidents in Japan), but also threatens indirectly
the existence of humankind through the total destruction (global warming; sea level changes)
of the biosphere.
Globalisation can also be said to encompass and exacerbate other dimensions of security such
as the societal and military dimensions. Globalisation impacts upon the societal dimension of
security, defined as the perceived erosion of the collective identity of certain social groups
(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998; 119-21), due to its promotion of trans and intra-national
migration which can bring different ethnic or religious groups into contact and occasionally
conflict. Globalisation's prinicpal impact in the dimension of military security is indirect. The
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onset of globalisation and its related intergrative and disintegrative economic effects can both
lay the grounds for and exacerbate military conflicts. Finally, as well as globalisation's
influence upon the inter-linking of the different dimensions of security, it also clearly inter-
meshes or supersedes the domestic and international security agendas--the conflict generating
effects of globalisation on the domestic level often threatening to spill over into international
tensions and conflicts.
3. Responses
A number of other papers at the working group will deal with the question of how security
actors can respond to the problems engendered by globalisation. Hence, the objective of this
paper is simply to stress that the inherent nature of globalisation and its supra-territoriality
means that its associated security problems cannot be responded to within the traditional
confines of the territorial sovereign state or by utilising the traditional tools of security policy.
Globalisation's ability to circumvent territorial boundaries gives all of its related security
dimensions a transnational and trans-sovereign character. Issues such as economic
dislocation, crime and environmental pollution function across sovereign frontiers. States are
then faced with security problems which demand policy responses that are also trans-
sovereign. This makes clear the need for multinational cooperation and, most controversially,
the (hopefully voluntary) abrogation at times of the principle of exclusive sovereignty in
order to construct policies which can also pursue global security problems across state
frontiers. However, whilst the sovereign state, due to its continued overwhelming disposition
of power, certainly remains the principal supplier of security in an era of globalisation, the
analysis above has also indicated that it needs to share this role with other actors, including
international organisations, social groups, TNCs and NGOs. Moreover, the nature of
globalisation as often a economic phenomenon also means that military power alone is not
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sufficient to meets its security demands. Thus, there is a need for comprehensive approaches
to security which employ military power in balanced combination with economic power.
Globalisation and security in the Asia-Pacific
Differential impact of globalisation in the Asia-Pacific
This paper has already described a number of security problems which have occurred in the
Asia-Pacific region and which can be seen to be associated with globlisation. The East Asian
financial crisis has been the most prominent of these and impacted on all levels of security
from that of the state to the individual, and across all dimensions from the economic to the
environmental, and even to the military, at least in terms of scaling back of arms
procurements. But the East Asian financial crisis was only one indication of the ongoing
impact of globalisation upon the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The continuing
integration of the region into the global political economy is likely to only accentuate
problems of economic security. For instance, economic exclusion can be said to have
underlain many of North Korea's internal and external security problems in the post-Cold
War period; economic disparity and uneven growth presents problems for the territorial and
political unity of China and the Russian Far East, and the internal political stability of a
number of Southeast Asian states; economic competition has given rise to concerns about
conflict over energy resources in the region; and economic dislocation is a continuing
problem for states in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, trans-sovereign crime is
growing in the region (Dupont 1999), with renewed problems of narcotics cartels and piracy
in Southeast Asia; and environmental degradation is also continuing largely unchecked in the
region, as demonstrated by the reoccurrence of the 'haze' in Indonesia and Malaysia since
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1997. All these problems also draw attention to the fact that security situation in the region is
affected by TNCs, NGOs, social groupings and individuals as well as by sovereign states.
It is possible, then, to identify a host of problems in the Asia-Pacific which illustrate the
crucial interconnection between globalisation and security. Moreover, from the evidence of
the East Asian financial crisis, it might be possible to argue that the security impact of
globalisation has been differentially heavy in the Asia-Pacific compared to many other
regions. The limited space of this paper does not allow for a more detailed attempt to
catalogue all of the problems of the globalisation-security nexus in the region. Instead, the
remaining part of this paper is devoted to an investigation of the possible reasons as to why
the region may be particularly prone to the effects of post-globalisation security problems.
As stated in the introduction to this paper, it is important to understand the relationship
between globalisation and security through reference to both generic analytical frameworks
and specific regional contexts. The first section of this paper argued that the essence of
globalisation as a security problem is to be found in its transcendence of barriers to
interaction across social space, and hence its challenge to the sovereign state as the existing
basis for the global security order. The forces of globalisation quickly search out any
inconsistencies and flaws in the structure of the sovereign state, and can prise open its
external security barriers. Consequently, this suggests that in order to comprehend the reasons
for the differential impact of globalisation across regions then it is necessary to examine the
differential nature of sovereign states in each region, and their ability to absorb and withstand
the security shocks associated with globalisation processes. Much of what follows is painted
in very broad brush strokes and its generalisations cannot capture the entire complexity of the
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region. But it is hoped that at the very least it will provide a framework for making
intelligible the nature of states and the political economy in the Asia-Pacific.
Vulnerable sovereign states: decolonisation, bipolarisation, and globalisation
If attention is then turned to examining the condition of sovereign states in the Asia-Pacific
region, it can be seen that they are particularly vulnerable to th  inh rent qualities of
globalisation due to the dual influence of decolonisation and bipolarisation upon the state-
building process in the post-war period. The effect of decolonisation upon the Asia-Pacific
region was to create states modelled in theory along the lines of the sovereign and nation
states of their former colonial masters, but which in practice have not always conformed to
these ideals. In many instances, the idea of the sovereign state came before or diverged from
that of the nation state: shown by the fact that the territorial and sovereign space of states in
the region was often delineated along former colonial borders which had been drawn in
arbitrary fashion and in contradistinction to trans-border ties of ethnicity and religion. These
contradictions between sovereign space and societal composition clearly weakened from the
start the internal political cohesion of states in the region, and laid the ground for the potential
divisibility between the security interests of the state and its social constituents. Moreover,
the common legacy of distorted development from the colonial period also placed these states
in a disadvantageous economic position to maintain their internal stability. Therefore, the
preoccupation of many states in the Asia-Pacific region since the post-colonial has been to
preserve their internal integrity by advancing the process of state-building, and particularly in
the economic sphere, as a means to reconcile these structural contradictions (Ayoob 1995:
21-45).
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The problematic position of ewly-established sovereign states in the region was further
compounded either during or immediately after the decolonisation phase by the impact of the
onset of the Cold War. The translation to the Asia-Pacific of the contest between the
ideologies and political economies of the US and USSR led to the division of certain states
and the biopolarisation of the region to varying degrees.  As is well known, the bifurcation of
the region in the early Cold War period was to create a legacy of military confrontation which
has endured in many cases to this day. Nevertheless, perhaps more important when
considering the post-Cold War and post-globalisation security agendas is the affect of the
Cold War upon the state building-agenda and related political economies of many of the new
states in the region. The Cold War in effect divided the Asia-Pacific region into three zones
of political economy (Spero 1997: 12-17): a zone of independence centred for the early part
of the Cold War upon a socialist bloc under the auspices of the USSR; a zone of
interdependence centred upon the US, and increasingly Japan as well, throughout most of the
Cold War; and a zone of dependence, consisting mainly of the newer sovereign states in
Southeast Asia, which although seeking economic independence was increasingly drawn into
the zone of interdependence, with Japan playing a major role in this process. The zone of
independence created an alternative economic system to that of liberal capitalism and ensured
the security of many of its members, although it showed increasing signs of breaking down
throughout the latter period of the Cold War and as the USSR and China split the zone
internally. However, this zone of independence was also eventually to be rendered asunder by
the economic pressure from the zone of interdependence at the end of the Cold War, so
leaving the already internally weak states of the zone exposed to the forces of liberal
capitalism.
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Meanwhile, the zone of interdependence can be conceived of in the Cold War period as a
form of proto-globalisation and liberal economic system under the leadership of the US. This
system was also to affect the state-building efforts of those states within its ambit. On t e one
hand, the system provided markets and aid which accelerated the economic growth of certain
states on the semi-periphery and later the centre, such as Japan, as well as pulling along the
growth of other states on the periphery and located in the zone of dependence in Southeast
Asia. In this way, states were able to develop distinctive variations of developmental
capitalism and to use economic growth to mitigate problems of internal stability. On the o her
hand, though, the system, revolving as it did around a form of proto-globalisation which was
designed to support the security interests of the US and thus which insulated these states to
some degree from full competition, also had particular effects on the evolution of these states'
political economies. Hence, in extreme case states in the region were propped up by external
aid, but more usually evolved political economies which were developmental in orientation
but systemically vulnerable to the fully unleashed global capitalism. Thus, these states may
have been able to overcome to some extent the economic shocks of the early 1970s and to
move towards a new path of development in the new international division of labour. But at
the same time, these states were still given special dispensations within the zone of
interdependency, consisting of access to technology and the developed markets of the US and
West, whilst simultaneously being able to restrict access to their own markets (Strange 1996:
6-7).
Therefore, the twin processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation have had a distinct impact
upon the development of the sovereign states of the Asia-Pacific. Firstly, these processes
have created states marked by internal contradictions between the delineation of territorial
space and societal composition, and a consequent preoccupation with attempts to reconcile
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the two by the defence of the principle of sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite all these efforts,
there still remains a near ineradicable and potential divisibility between the proclaimed
security interests of these state and large sections of their citizenry--the very conditions which
globalisation is capable of highlighting to the detriment of security. Secondly, they have
created states either fundamentally unprepared to cope with global economic forces as in the
case of certain former members of the zone of independence such as North Korea, or states
driven by the need to exploit the benefits of liberal capitalism to preserve their own internal
stability, but which have been insulated in the past from the full effects of capitalism's
tendency towards periodic crises. In sum, the Asia-Pacific has been characterised by states
vulnerable to those forces which attack territorial sovereignty and generate external economic
shocks, so frustrating state-building agendas.
Based on this understanding of the nature of sovereign states in the Asia-Pacific, the reasons
for the differentially heavy impact of globalisation in the region become clearer. Quite
simply, globalisation, especially when it generates seismic economic shocks on the scale of
the East Asian financial crisis, represents the very antithesis of state-building agendas in the
region. Globalisation is mercilessly capable of laying bare the internal weaknesses of states.
This is not to say that states cannot adapt to and successfully ride the globalisation wave, and
then utilise the benefits of economic growth to push forward their state-building efforts. But
globalisation is also a double-edged sword, due to its ability to undermine sovereignty and
produce economic dislocation. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and merging of the
zones of independence, dependence and interdependence, there is no longer a great incentive
for the US to provide special economic dispensations to the states of the Asia-Pacific, so
increasing the pressure for them to adopt neo-liberal modes of capitalism. The final outcome
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is then to deepen and widen the process of globalisation in the Asia-Pacific and to expose its
political economies to greater security risks in the process of adjustment to liberal capitalism.
Conclusion: the future security agenda of the Asia-Pacific
This paper has attempted to sketch the connection between globalisation and security through
the use of generic frameworks for analysis and the regional context in the Asia-Pacific. It has
demonstrated how globalisation as a qualitatively new phenomenon is capable of
transcending territorial and sovereign space, and has challenged us to extend our conceptions
of security both vertically and horizontally. Globalisation requires us to consider security
from the level of the state down to that of the individual, and across the dimensions of
economic, environmental, societal and military security. Moreover, this paper has also shown
how globalisation has a differential impact across regions in accordance with the ability of
sovereign states, the existing unit for ordering social space, to resist the impact of trans-
sovereign problems. In the case of the Asia-Pacific, the twin processes of decolonisation and
bipolarisation have placed relative limits upon this ability for states, and enabled
globalisation to exacerbate existing security problems in the region. I  turn, the continuing
spread of globalisation in the region indicates that it is increasingly necessary to place
alongside the traditional post-Cold War military security agenda of policy-makers an
alternative (and certainly not an entirely new in the case of many states in the region long
preoccupied with problems of internal and comprehensive security) one which focusses upon
problems in the economic, environmental and societal dimensions. The optimum policy
response of states to these problems--for at least for the time being these are the only social
units with sufficient resources and legitimacy to spearhead the defence of other social
groupings from globalisation's worst excesses--is something to be discussed in other sessions
of this working group. However, it is perhaps clear that the sovereign state, mismatched as it
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is in its capabilities against a phenomenon which challenges its very raison d'être of
sovereignty, can only hope to respond effectively to the challenges of globalisation by also
assuming more flexible and adaptive forms.  All too often in the Asia-Pacific there is an
underlying assumption (eminently understandable, though it may be) that globalisation is
simply another historical phase, like that of the Cold War, which disadvantages the states of
the region but which can be adapted to if the 'rules of the game' are simply relearned. There is
a sense that the states of the region can come away relatively unscathed from the hazardous
game of globalisation if they exercise sufficient guile and use a 'pick and mix' approach to the
phenomena--taking the positive benefits but screening themselves off from the perceived
negative aspects of globalisation.
Larger states in the region such as China may well be better positioned to follow this
approach. China is blessed with a geographical size that to some degree provides it with
scope to dampen over the short term, although certainly not halt over the longer term, the
onset of centrifugal globalisation pressures; whilst the perceived size of its market and
position as a production base equips with a certain degree of structural power in the
international political economy to influence the pace and terms of globalisaiton. Other states
such as Japan have had the good fortune of the 'window of opportunity' of the Cold War and
alignment with the US. These have enabled Japan to climb to a level of economic
development in the international political economy, and continue with state-building
attempts, to the point whereby it is sufficiently strong as a state to weather the impact of
globalisation.
But the fact that even states such as China and Japan, with their mixed advantages of size,
wealth and strategic position are shaken by globalisation, is suggestive of the fact that it is
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likely to have a far graver impact upon the smaller and weaker states of the region. For these
states there is less opportunity to pick and choose from the globalisation menu and they have
to increasingly take the phenomena wholesale. In this situation, they are unable to just learn
or influence the rules of an existing game, but have to learn a new game entirely--a game
which increasingly negates or reinvents the function of sovereignty and which further
redistributes power to the large states and to non-state actors. It is only by taking on board
this painful lesson that states can adapt to globalisation and tackle its related security issues.
However, that this realisation may not yet have dawned on many of the political elites in the
region only gives cause for concern.
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